Indice
The two-way one-contracting party exchange performed within the corporate group therefore causes the added value of the activities carried out within it to be artificially channelled into some intra-group legal entities to the detriment of others.
One of the most important consequences of the one-contracting party economy is in fact the structural decoupling between productivity and labour income distribution.
The most obvious case is that of labour-intensive activities carried out by subsidiaries and rendered in favour of other associated companies, usually the parent company. In this case, the subsidiaries formally act as suppliers to their parent company, mainly employing labour, e.g. for the performance of activities such as customer care, back office, administrative and accounting activities or even the work performed by riders. In truth, these activities are not labour-intensive, as their performance require expensive technological infrastructures, which incorporate the know-how of the production chain in which the workforce is employed.
Since the technology and other value added elements are managed by other group companies, it happens that the one providing the workforce is not able to actually provide the service – e.g. customer care -, but has to turn to the other factors of production provided by other companies of its corporate group. This formally generates one or more exchanges, the contracting party of which is the parent company (or other intra-group company), which has a vested interest in the subsidiary formally hiring the workforce, so as to pay it as little as possible.
This results in a distribution between group companies of the number of workers that is functional to achieving this goal.
By possessing the technology and the power to control the company, it is a rather easy process to achieve this goal. Indeed, it is sufficient for the parent company to unilaterally set – on account of the control exercised – a price for the supply of labour that is barely sufficient to pay salaries, thus providing itself, free of charge or for consideration, the other means necessary for which to carry out the activities. In this way, improvements in know-how and technology of the group company as a whole are not transferred to the labour factor. In other words, labour productivity is artificially reduced by subtracting the added value from the company supplying the labour.
If the workforce is located in countries where the labour protection system is strong, there is an interest on the part of the holding company to ensure that there are no regulatory or trade union pressures that would force a fairer distribution of the wealth produced.
The control and technical-organisational management of the activities carried out by the subsidiaries is fundamental in order to have an influence on the distribution of added value. Depending on the inputs intermediated and the regulatory set-up of the host country, the one-contracting party exchange method of maximising accumulation becomes apparent with varying degrees and intensity. The lower the capacity of the group’s ‘control room’ to remotely control activities, the greater the degree of autonomy of those in charge of managing the foreign subsidiaries.