Indice
The expansion of multinational enterprises through the instrument of the corporate group has proved to be one of the main building blocks of the new global production chains, capable of shaping market structures as well as the scope of action of politics and intermediate social bodies such as trade unions and business associations.
The interest shown by international organisations such as the OECD and the IMF is mainly of a statistical nature, whereas that of international political institutions, such as the EU, is primarily regulatory.
By maintaining a more or less constant interdisciplinary approach, this study shows that without a properly defined theoretical economic and legal model, both fields of study are subject to limits that cannot be resolved in a self-referential manner: the dialogue between jurists and economists is inevitable.
From a legal perspective, the terminological contradiction between autonomy and subjection to external control represents a serious limitation, as it is, by its very nature, an insoluble one. It might therefore be useful to restore relevance to theoretical approaches centred on the concept of the enterprise — that is, on the link between governance and the attribution of entrepreneurial responsibility — to be considered as the cornerstone for identifying the anomalies of the various group law systems currently in force in different parts of the world.
From an economic point of view, it is necessary to become fully aware that this anomaly has also represented an obstacle for sectoral studies based on the classical enterprise paradigm. Only recently has it begun to be understood that the model of the multinational firm — and, consequently, the new global production chains — requires a paradigm shift, within which the exchanges carried out by independent firms and those carried out between companies belonging to the same group cannot be treated on the same level.
In this regard, it may be useful to recall the idea that the production function of a single-firm enterprise is structurally different from that of a corporate group, which is given by the summation of distinct production functions — as many as the number of subsidiaries — and in each of these, the distribution of the factors determining productivity, value added, and profit is distorted, since it follows the organisational logic of the parent company’s interest.
On this point, significant progress has been made in terms of statistical detection, mainly by the aforementioned international institutions. However, we are still far from producing sufficiently realistic data, bearing in mind that no statistical solution can exist without also being regulatory, and no regulatory solution can exist without also being statistical.
A basic theoretical model is therefore needed on which to build new studies and statistical models, and it is believed that the “theory of the one-contracting-party apparent economy” — which is at once economic and legal — can fulfil this function, since the core of the phenomenon lies precisely in the theoretical and factual notion that transactions carried out between a parent company and a subsidiary are distorted or potentially manipulated exchanges, given that buyer and seller ultimately coincide in a single market operator, making the exchange, as repeatedly stated, a true economic fiction.
Continuing to seek theoretical compromises — such as defining a controlled company as a “quasi-company” — is merely counterproductive. The problem must be addressed directly, not circumnavigated.
Starting from this premise, some of the most important consequences of this new paradigm of enterprise and exchange have been outlined — consequences that carry remarkable scientific and political significance:
the uncontrolled manipulation of transactions and of price setting radically changes the very notion of productivity, of value added, and of profit as conventionally understood in both scientific and political discourse; it causes a dangerous alteration in the distribution of income between labour and capital, inevitably leading to the neutralisation of trade union power; and it may trigger and amplify dangerous financial crises.
Moreover, as shown by the work of European institutions and other international organisations, unjust fiscal advantages can easily be derived — to the detriment of public institutions — by strategically positioning subsidiaries on the global chessboard, while intra-group credit and debt relations have major financial consequences for the territories in which these entities operate.
Consequently, the theory of the one-contracting-party apparent economy could serve as a theoretical model for constructing statistical frameworks and databases that are as realistic as possible.
To this end, it is intended to propose an economic and statistical indicator based on the model of the aggregate production function of multinational groups.
A carefully designed data collection system, supported by mandatory disclosure obligations for transnational enterprises in all productive sectors, could lead to the creation of databases and technological tools capable of anticipating — and possibly preventing — financial crises.
Without adequate regulation, technological evolution will only further amplify the distortive potential of one-contracting-party exchanges, dragging states ever deeper into a condition of structural impotence in the face of the evolution of global markets.
The development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) will, in fact, unfold largely within the existing model of the global enterprise, thereby exponentially increasing the risks described above.
For these reasons, it is also evident that so-called anti-globalisation political measures, such as tariffs, may create some organisational and financial challenges for multinational corporate groups; however, with the regulatory and technological tools at their disposal, these groups can quite easily shift the resulting higher costs — paradoxically even onto the very governments driving the trade war — through targeted organisational restructuring of plants and subsidiaries, a process that current statistical systems can only record ex post.
Great caution must also be exercised regarding the social and humanitarian consequences arising from the restructuring of global production chains, which could prove disastrous for countries that, for one reason or another, become — or will become — less economically advantageous.
Another risk is that of triggering or accelerating financial crises, the consequences of which are currently impossible to predict.
Only the ability of governments and parliaments to engage in dialogue and find a global statistical and regulatory solution can lead the way out of the crisis induced by globalisation.
Moreover, the moment is a delicate one: we have just entered a risky phase of both technological and regulatory transition — and mistakes in legislation or international agreements could prove disastrous.